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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15 • Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
iv. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson, a 
passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for faulty brake lights, 
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
2. Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson to run a 
warrants check violate Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
v. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal 
action may taken an appeal from a final judgment and conviction of 
any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
vi. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, : Cqse No. 860222-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended). Ms. Johnson was 
found guilty on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy 
Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office stopped a vehicle 
with a broken brakelight at 3200 South, 900 East (T. 5-6). 
According to the officer, he ran a check on the license plates of 
the vehicle prior to the actual stop, and obtained the name of the 
registered owner (T. 6). 
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and 
asked the driver for identification. She produced a driver's 
license but was unable to produce registration which the officer 
requested when he learned that the driver was not the registered 
owner (T. 6). 
After asking the driver for registration, the officer 
asked the passenger, Karen Johnson, for identification (T. 6-7). 
She told the officer she did not have identification, but gave him 
her name and date of birth. The officer took the driver's license 
and the information from Ms. Johnson back to his vehicle, where he 
ran a warrants check (T. 7). He told the driver and Ms. Johnson 
that he would be back in a minute and indicated that he expected Ms. 
Johnson to wait while he returned to his car (T. 22). 
The officer testified that he went back to his car, 
called dispatch, and inquired whether there were any outstanding 
warrants on Ms. Johnson (T. 15). He ran a check on Ms. Johnson 
"(b)ecause there was a possibility that (the) vehicle could have 
been stolen" (T. 7-8). However, he did not run a check to see 
whether the car was stolen (T. 12). The officer also testified that 
it was not unusual to stop cars and find that the owner was not 
driving (T. 17, 18). The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16) and the 
only information which made the officer speculate that it might be 
stolen was the fact that the registered owner was not driving and 
the driver was unable to find registration (T. 7-8). Ms. Johnson 
was merely riding with her friend to pick up the child of her 
friend's roommate (T. 24). 
The officer acknowledged that ascertaining whether Ms. 
Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him determine 
whether the car was stolen (T. 15), but claimed that if Ms. Johnson 
had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly" would think it 
more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16). 
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The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to 
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop 
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might 
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21). Th^ officer was unsure how 
much time passed from when he returned to his car until he received 
information from dispatch, but knew it was at least several minutes 
(T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, fifteen minutes passed between 
the time the officer asked her for her name and the time he returned 
(T. 28). 
Dispatch informed the officer that the driver had a 
suspended drivers license and that Ms. Johnson had outstanding 
warrants (T. 8). 
The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and incident to that 
arrest, searched her bag, producing the evidence with which she was 
convicted of the offense in this case (T. 9-11). 
Ms. Johnson's testimony differed from that of Officer 
Stroud in that she recalled that the officer first took the license 
of the driver to his car, then returned in five to ten minutes (T. 
26). She remembered the length of time because she smoked one or 
two cigarettes while waiting (T. 26). When he returned, the officer 
asked Ms. Johnson to walk back to his car and give him her name and 
date of birth. The officer wrote the information on a clipboard, 
then told Ms. Johnson to return to and sit in the vehicle in which 
she had been riding (T. 27). 
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson, by and through counsel, 
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from her person or 
property on the grounds that all items seized were the fruit of an 
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unlawful seizure of her person in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution (R. 14-15). See Addendum A. The trial court held 
an evidentiary hearing on the motion, after which it denied the 
motion to suppress "unless defendant can submit law to the contrary" 
(R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ms. Johnson, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a 
traffic citation, was seized when the officer requested her name and 
indicated that she wait while he ran a warrants check on her. 
Because he lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify such detention, 
Ms. Johnson's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution were violated and the evidence seized should have been 
suppressed. 
The seizure of Ms. Johnson also violated her rights under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
_ 4 _ 
While this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
recognized that not all encounters between police and citizens 
amount to "seizures11 (See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 
1987); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)), where a 
"seizure" does occur, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply. 
In State v, Deitman, supra, the Utah Supreme Court quoted 
United States v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984) in setting 
forth three levels of interaction between police and citizens: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an "articulable 
suspicion" that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is 
being committed. [citation omitted] 
State v. Deitman, supra at 617-18. 
As this court pointed out in footnote 3 of State v. 
Trujillo, supra at 87, "(a) majority of the United States Supreme 
Court has been unable to agree on the precise parameters of when a 
"seizure11 occurs ... 1fstop and frisk" situations. [citations 
omitted] The Trujillo court stated"(a) seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer by means of 
physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the 
liberty of a person" Id. at 87 citing United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1980)(plurality opinion), A seizure occurs when a 
reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, believes he is not free to leave. United States v. 
Mendenhall, supra at 554. 
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In State v. Trujillo, supra at 87-88, this Court pointed 
out that a seizure "does not occur when a police officer merely 
approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the 
person is willing to listen." (citations omitted). While a brief 
encounter with a citizen on the street may not amount to a "seizure" 
within some circumstances, the stop of a motor vehicle is a 
detention of the driver and occupants of that vehicle. See Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (CA9 1973), the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required that the officer have a 
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts in order to detain 
the defendant for a warrants check after issuing a citation to him 
for jaywalking. The Court reasoned that the officer seized the 
defendant when he asked the defendant to come to the police car. 
Thereafter, the officer exceeded the scope of the detention when he 
ran a warrants check after issuing a citation. 
In Johnson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Cr. App. 
1980), (pet. cert. den. June 30, 1980), the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that a police officer, after stopping a 
vehicle for a traffic citation, did not have a right, absent a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the passenger was involved in 
criminal activity, to check the passenger. In that case, after 
stopping the vehicle, the officer walked to the passenger side and 
opened the door to "check the passenger." The marijuana found as a 
result of opening the door and checking the passenger was suppressed. 
The contact between Ms. Johnson and Officer Stroud was a 
seizure requiring an articulable suspicion based on objective facts 
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in order to be justified. (See State v. Deitman, supra; United 
States v. Merritt, supra.) The officer stopped the vehicle in which 
Ms. Johnson was riding (T. 5-6). After obtaining her name and date 
of birth he ran a warrants check from his vehicle (T. 6-7). He 
expected Ms. Johnson to wait for him (T. 22) and Ms. Johnson sat in 
the car and waited as she had been told to do (T. 29-30). According 
to the officer, several minutes passed whi^ .e he was running the 
check (T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, she waited fifteen minutes 
while the officer ran the warrants check (T. 28). Unlike the 
defendants in Deitman, Ms. Johnson was not free to leave and she 
reasonably believed that the officer was detaining her. In 
addition, because she was a passenger in a motor vehicle which the 
officer had stopped, she did not have the same physical freedom to 
leave that the defendants in Deitman had. 
While the initial detention of Ms. Johnson was a 
"seizure", it did not amount to an arrest and therefore a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable, objective facts, rather than 
probable cause, was required. See State v. Deitman, supra; State v. 
Trujillo, supra. Because the officer had no such reasonable 
suspicion, the detention violated the Fourth Amendment. See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed 2d 889 (1968). 
The officer could articulate no objective facts upon 
which to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson. While he detained 
her in part to see whether she had outstanding warrants, he had no 
objective facts upon which to base a belief that such warrants 
existed (T. 20-21). The officer testified that he suspected that 
the car in which Ms. Johnson was riding may have been stolen 
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(T. 7-8). However/ his suspicion was not strong enough to cause him 
to run a check on the car to see if it was stolen (T. 12) even 
though he had the opportunity to do so and ran a check on Ms. 
Johnson to see whether she had warrants for stealing cars (T. 16). 
The officer based his speculation that the car might be 
stolen on the fact that someone other than the registered owner of 
the vehicle was driving and the driver could not find the 
registration (T. 13). However, he testified that such a situation 
was not unusual (T. 17). The car was in fact not stolen and Ms. 
Johnson believed that the driver had borrowed it from her roommate 
so that the driver could pick up the roommate's child at 
kindergarten (T. 16, 24). The record does not establish whether the 
officer gave the driver an opportunity to explain her inability to 
locate the registration or the circumstances under which she 
borrowed the car. 
Common sense suggests that an inability to find the 
registration is as consistent with the circumstances of a borrowed 
car as it is with the circumstances of a stolen car. To find that 
the officer had an articulable suspicion in this case would be to 
suggest that all passengers and drivers in borrowed cars are subject 
to police detention. In addition, even if there were an articulable 
suspicion that the car was stolen, that suspicion does not 
automatically fall on the passenger. In State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 
1380, 1382-83 (1986), the Utah Supreme Court found that "a person's 
mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable 
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that 
person." 
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Because the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the 
detention violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. As a result, the evidence obtained as a result of the 
initial illegal detention, including that obtained in the search of 
Ms. Johnson's bag, should be suppressed in accordance with Terry v. 
Ohio, supra. 
POINT II, THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED 
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oatlfi or affirmation, 
particularly describing the pla£e to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has followed the Fourth Amendment 
standard in deciding search and seizure cases argued under the Utah 
Constitution, (See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1987), 
nothing prevents Utah from analyzing this Constitutional provision 
differently from the federal approach, especially in a case such as 
this where there is no Fourth Amendment case on point. 
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 3171, 321 (Alaska 1985), the 
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska's 
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording 
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme 
Court under the federal constitution." The Court in Jones chose to 
apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska 
law than is required under the federal constitution. The Washington 
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Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 
136 (Wash. 1984), In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington 
Constitution provided greater protections then did the federal 
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by police. Id. at 143. 
In State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978), an 
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation, and ordered the 
passengers out of the car. As one of the passengers was getting 
out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that: 
(B)y stopping the automobile the police have decided 
that the driver will be detained. Such is not the 
case for the passenger, who has not broken the law 
and who may walk away from the scene unless the 
police officer has some other legitimate reason to 
detain him. Certainly the passenger has a higher 
expectation of privacy than the driver, because the 
passenger plays no part in the routine traffic 
infraction and has reason to suppose that any 
exchange with the authorities will be conducted by 
the driver alone. 
The Williams Court, without deciding the Fourteenth 
Amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution the 
detention of the passengers was not permissible. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop 
any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
The language of U.C.A. §77-7-15 indicates an intent on 
the part of Utah's legislature to provide the citizens of this state 
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with greater protection than is provided by the federal constitution 
as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, supra. 
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a 
person only when the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that 
criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Hence, while 
the United States Constitution may allow for police citizen 
encounters absent a reasonable suspicion (See United States v. 
Merritt, supra), the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise, 
requiring a police officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop 
and question a person. Hence, Utah statutory and constitutional law 
require a reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual, 
even where the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson 
when he detained her to run a warrants check (See discussion at 5-7) 
(See also State v. Larocco, _supr-. ->r discussion of what 
constitutes a "seizure"). The language of the statute shows that in 
Utah, any detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name 
amounts to a seizure. However, even if this court does not agree 
that any detention where the officer asks a person for 
identification amounts to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and 
constitutional law, the detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a 
seizure of her person. The officer detained Ms, Johnson for 
anywhere from several to fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer 
did more than merely obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's 
identity. He expected her to remain in the car while he ran a 
warrants check; she was not free to leave and therefore was 
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detained. As the Court in United States v. Luckett, supra, found 
requiring a defendant to wait while a warrants check was run 
constituted a detention. 
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon 
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms. 
Johnson. The officer did know whether the car was stolen, nor did 
he run a check to find out even though he had the opportunity to do 
so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen (which it was not), 
there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a crime which may have 
been committed by the driver (See State v. Banks, supra). The 
officer had a hunch which later proved to be incorrect; a hunch does 
not amount to a reasonable suspicion. 
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding 
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 
77-7-15 (1953 as amended). Pursuant to the statute, an officer must 
have reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name 
and address. Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion 
could have attached to Ms. Johnson. 
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the 
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful 
seizure should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Johnson 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence. 
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DATED this 7 daY °f December, 1987. 
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DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
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Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILEEt) IN CLERK'S OFFlCc 
Sajt Lake County. Utah 
1937 
DEBRA K. LOY (3901) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 /"' or"*" • w< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR86-1728 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
COMES NOW, the defendant, KAREN M. JOHNSON, by and through her 
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and hereby moves the Court to 
Suppress all evidence seized from her person or property including 
alleged amphetamines, alleged paraphernalia and alleged burglary tools 
on the grounds said items were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her 
person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah. 
DATED this o day of January, 1987. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
JL y 
-&u 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant 
cr 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above-entitled 
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 16th day of January, 
1987 at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable RAYMOND S. UNO. 
DATED this •> day of January, 1987. 
Mi \JK_ k , i'l^i 
DEBRA K. LOY ^ 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of January, 1987. 
DELIVERED BY 
JAN 0 8 1987 
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